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Traditional bilateral investment treaties (BITs) focus on investment protection, i.e., 
regulate post-establishment aspects of foreign investment. In recent times, investment 
agreements have increasingly been supplemented with liberalization rules and also 
clauses on, e.g., key personnel, labor rights and sustainable development. Such 
integrated investment accords have notably become part of preferential trade 
agreements (PTAs). This trend started with NAFTA, continued with the negotiations 
on a Multilateral Agreement on Investment (MAI),1 and has in the course of the past 
ten years increasingly characterized PTAs throughout the world. The rapid 
proliferation of PTAs has, in the investment field, unfortunately led to lower quality 
provisions. Many of these treaties contain such wide-ranging exceptions and vaguely 
formulated safeguard clauses that their regulatory value as regards the protection of 
foreign investments in their post-establishment phase is called into question.  
 
There is no doubt that the world would benefit from more comprehensive investment 
rules. But the question is how best to achieve them through treaty design. Is it 
advisable to have all the elements under discussion in one instrument (the NAFTA 
approach), or would it be preferable to have separate instruments for different subject 
matters (the traditional OECD approach)? From the viewpoint of negotiating tactics, 
the single-treaty approach may have certain advantages. However, experience shows 
that a multiple-instruments solution (where protection is separated from the other 
elements) helps to avoid problems that are extremely difficult to overcome in a single-
treaty approach. Based on my experience with the MAI negotiations and many PTA 
negotiations with investment chapters, I am convinced that the single-treaty approach, 
which closely connects investment liberalization and protection issues, ultimately has 
negative effects on both areas. This has to do with the different legal and economic 
characteristics of the two areas.  
 
Investment protection rules as they relate to post-establishment present clear 
characteristics of property law. As a matter of principle, provisions of this kind ought 
to have a broad scope since basically all kinds of assets are worth protecting. 
Traditional BITs therefore usually feature comprehensive, asset-based definitions of 
the term “investment”. Extensive exceptions to the broad coverage of investment 
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protection are neither necessary nor desirable. Contrary to the property-oriented 
provisions on protection, investment liberalization rules have a trade-policy character. 
In the trade field, sector exceptions to the basic disciplines of an agreement are a 
normal feature. Also, from a trade-policy perspective, free market access is mainly, if 
not exclusively, of importance for direct investment as opposed to short-term capital 
movements.  
 
If one aims for a single instrument combining protection and liberalization elements 
and providing only for one set of definitions (which is normally the case), one almost 
inevitably runs into virtually insurmountable problems. Take the case of portfolio 
investment: from a protection point of view, it may be desirable to use an asset-based 
definition of investment that also covers portfolio investment; from a liberalization 
angle, one might, however, wish to restrict the definition to direct investment. In 
practical treaty terms, the most frequently chosen way out of this dilemma is to have a 
broad investment definition together with some kind of a safeguard clause allowing 
the host country to intervene more or less at its own discretion in the free flow of 
capital. This solution, however, undermines legal security -- whereas the main 
purpose of investment agreements is to enhance such security. Similar problems occur 
in respect of national treatment if exceptions to the basic rule – as is usually the case – 
do not differentiate between pre- and post-establishment (reservations that seem 
reasonable regarding market access may be problematic regarding post-
establishment).   
 
The problems are by no means theoretical. In the MAI discussions, e.g., negotiators 
were grappling with the investment definition throughout the negotiating process 
without arriving at a satisfactory solution, as they were never able to decide on a 
concept supported by all sides. While I would not say that this was the reason for the 
breakdown of the negotiations, I contend that the combination of investment 
protection elements with liberalization and other regulatory features in one treaty, 
together with the intended generally and unavoidably applicable investor-state 
dispute-settlement (broad “prior consent”), were the real reasons behind the failure of 
the negotiations – rather than any one or more of the somewhat superficial reasons 
that are often put forward.  
 
What, then, is the proper context for addressing issues concerning investment and 
development, which include aspects of sustainability, employment and human rights? 
It should be clear from the above that these issues are much closer to the liberalization 
aspects of investment-treaty-making than to the – not really negotiable – protection 
aspects. Moreover, liberalization and development issues are mainly relevant in the 
context of direct investment. This should be kept in mind when discussing the need to 
rebalance investors' rights and the sovereign interests of host countries. It also seems 
obvious that, given their political and systemic nature, rebalancing efforts should 
essentially take place on a multilateral level. 
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 The MAI negotiations were an attempt to negotiate a comprehensive multilateral investment 
agreement, led by the OECD members, but also encompassing a number of other countries. The 
negotiations began in 1995 and were abandoned in 1998, essentially because of overly ambitious goals.  
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